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Abstract
The paper explores the use of concepts in cognitive psychology to evaluate the spread
of misinformation, disinformation and propaganda in online social networks. Analysing
online social networks to identify metrics to infer cues of deception will enable us to
measure diffusion of misinformation. The cognitive process involved in the decision to
spread information involves answering four main questions viz consistency of message,
coherency of message, credibility of source and general acceptability of message. We have
used the cues of deception to analyse these questions to obtain solutions for
preventing the spread of misinformation. We have proposed an algorithm to
effectively detect deliberate spread of false information which would enable users to
make informed decisions while spreading information in social networks. The
computationally efficient algorithm uses the collaborative filtering property of social
networks to measure the credibility of sources of information as well as quality of news
items. The validation of the proposed methodology has been done on the online social
network ‘Twitter’.
Keywords: Online social network; Misinformation; Disinformation; Cognitive
psychology
Introduction
Internet is a great source of information. It is also called the Web of deception. The use
of communication channels of the Internet to propagate false information has become
quite common. The advent of social networks has made every user a self-publisher with
no editing, checking for factual accuracy and clearly with no accountability. The facts
are presented with no authority and for millions of users seeing them on their computer
screen is itself a certificate of truthfulness of information being presented to them. In [1],
the dangers in the use of Internet like deliberate deception, deliberate misinformation,
and half-truths that can be used to divert a user from the real information being sought
have been discussed. The use of technologies by people to support lies, deception, mis-
direction, fraud, spin control, propaganda as discussed in the book have come true with
online social networks like Facebook and Twitter being used for purposes for which they
were not intended for. Validating the data on the Internet is a challenging proposition and
pitfalls by new users and experienced ones are far too often.
Online Social Networks (OSN) have become an important source of information for
a large number of people in the recent years. As the usage of social networks increased,
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the abuse of the media to spread disinformation and misinformation also increased many
fold. The spread of information or misinformation in online social networks is context
specific and studies have revealed topics such as health, politics, finances and technol-
ogy trends are prime sources of misinformation and disinformation in different contexts
to include business, government and everyday life [2]. The number of information diffu-
sion models do not take into consideration the type of information while modeling their
diffusion process. The information diffusion in social networks due to misinformation
or disinformation could follow different patterns of propagation and could be as a result
of an orchestrated campaign to mimic widespread information diffusion behaviour. The
lack of accountability and verifiability afford the users an excellent opportunity to spread
specific ideas through the network.
The detection of misinformation in large volumes of data is a challenging task. Meth-
ods using machine learning and Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques exist to
automate the process to some extent. However, because of the semantic nature of the
contents, the accuracy of automated methods is limited and quite often require manual
intervention. The amount of data generated in online social networks is so huge as to
make the task computationally expensive to be done in real time. In this paper, we pro-
pose a methodology to detect misinformation content using concepts based in cognitive
psychology. We analysed the literature on cognitive psychology to understand the pro-
cess of decision making of an individual. An individual is seen to make decisions based
on cues of deception or misinformation he obtains from the social network. Analysing
the social network data using suitable metrics to detect the same cues of deception would
enable us to identify patterns of spread ofmisinformation. This could be used by an online
user to take correct decisions about authenticity of information while spreading them. A
framework which would enable prevention of spread of inaccurate information would be
more effective than one which proposes counter measures after the information diffusion
process. We have implemented our proposed framework in Twitter.
Twitter has emerged as one of the more popular micro-blogging sites. Twitter enables
propagation of news in real time. Information propagates in Twitter in the form of short
messages of maximum 140 characters called ‘tweets’. The system enables one to sub-
scribe to another’s tweets by following them. It allows quick information dissemination by
retweeting the tweets one has received. The ability to post tweets frommobile devices like
smart phones, tablets and even by SMS have resulted in Twitter becoming the source of
information for many users. These capabilities also make Twitter a platform for spreading
misinformation easily.
Background and literature review
Concepts of information, misinformation and disinformation
How they differ?
It is essential to understand the related concepts of information, misinformation, disin-
formation and propaganda. The definition of information is clear by its very nature to the
users. But what needs to be defined is the different forms it can take. We are more inter-
ested in the usage of social networks to spread specific kind of information to alter the
behaviour or attitude of people. In the cyber space, manipulation of information so as to
affect the semantic nature of information and the way in which it is interpreted by users
is often called semantic attacks. Semantic attacks in social networks could be a result of
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propagation of information in various forms. This could take the shape ofmisinformation,
disinformation or propaganda. The distinction between information, misinformation and
disinformation is difficult to be made [3]. The three concepts are related to truth, and to
arrive at a universal acceptance of a single truth is almost impossible.
The term information is defined by the Oxford dictionary as ‘facts provided or learned
about something or someone’. The other forms of information are defined by Oxford
dictionary as under:
• Misinformation is false or inaccurate information, especially that which is
deliberately intended to deceive.
• Disinformation is false information that is intended to mislead, especially
propaganda issued by a government organization to a rival power or the media.
• Propaganda is defined as information, especially of a biased or misleading nature,
used to promote a political cause or point of view.
The three definitions have small differences and the most important fact is they involve
the propagation of false information with the intention and capability to mislead at least
some of the recipients. The advent of social networks has made the speed of propa-
gation of information faster, created large number of sources of information, produced
huge amounts of information in short duration of time and with almost no accountabil-
ity about the accuracy of data. The term ‘Big Data’ is often associated with the data in
social networks. Finding credible information after sifting out the different forms of false
information in online social networks has become a very challenging computational task.
In this paper, we intend to use the basic tenets of cognitive psychology to devise effi-
cient methods by which the task can be done. Our methodology involves detecting cues
of deception in online social networks to segregate false or misleading information with
the intention of developing an effective tool for evaluating the credibility of information
received by a user based on the source of the message as well its general acceptability in
the network.
Conceptual explanation of the distinguishing features
The concept of information, misinformation and disinformation have been differentiated
with respect to five important features by Karlova et al. [2]. They are truth, accuracy,
completeness, currency and deceptiveness. While all the three are informative in nature,
only disinformation is deliberatively deceptive information. The authors have also given a
social diffusion model of information, misinformation and disinformation as products of
social processes illustrating the way they are formed and disseminated in social networks.
The model suggests that people use cues to credibility and cues to deception to make
judgements while participating in the information diffusion process.
Accuracy of the information is one of the important measures of quality of information.
Honest mistake in the spread of inaccurate information is misinformation, whereas when
the intention is to deceive the recipient, it is disinformation. In [4], authors have outlined
the main features of disinformation.
• Disinformation is often the product of a carefully planned and technically
sophisticated deceit process.
• Disinformation may not come directly from the source that intends to deceive.
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• Disinformation is often written or verbal communication to include doctored
photographs, fake videos etc.
• Disinformation could be distributed very widely or targeted at specific people or
organizations.
• The intended targets are often a person or a group of people.
In order to classify as disinformation, it is not necessary that the disinformation has
to come directly from the source of disinformation [4]. In the chain of dissemination of
information, most of the people could actually be transmitting misleading information
(hence misinformation), though only one of the intermediaries may believe that the infor-
mation is actually misleading (hence disinformation). This is especially true for social
networks where the chain of propagation could be long and quite a few people involved
in the process.
Social networks with its freedomof expression, lack of filteringmechanisms like review-
ing and editing available in traditional publishing business coupled with high degree
of lack of accountability have become an important media for spread of misinforma-
tion. Summarily, the propagation of different versions of information, viz misinformation,
disinformation and propaganda involves the spread of false or inaccurate information
through information diffusion process involving users of social networks where all the
users may not be aware of the falsehood in the information. We have used the term
misinformation to denote any type of false information spreading in social networks.
Misinformation
The acceptance of misinformation or misleading information by the people depends
on their prior beliefs and opinions [5]. People believe things which support their prior
thoughts without questioning them. The same is also supported by research in cognitive
psychology [6]. The authors have brought out that preexisting political, religious or social
views make people accept information without verification if it conforms to their beliefs.
Countering such ideological and personal beliefs is indeed very difficult. Another impor-
tant finding was that countering the misinformation may lead to amplifying the beliefs
and reenforcing them.
Political astroturfing in the form of propagation of memes in Twitter was studied by
the Truthy team [7,8]. Investigating political election campaigns in US in the year 2010,
the research group uncovered a number of accounts sending out duplicate messages and
also retweeting messages from the same few accounts in a closely connected network. In
another case, 10 different accounts were used to send out thousands of posts, many of
them duplicates slightly altered to avoid detection as spam. With URL shorteners avail-
able, messages containing links could be altered to give different shortened links to the
same source and hence escaping the spam filters.
Decision making out of ignorance is often based on heuristics and the level of con-
fidence on the decision is also low, making correction easier. Such decisions are often
correct and are generally not catastrophic. False beliefs based on misinformation are
held strongly and often result in greater support for a cause. Such beliefs are also very
contagious and the person makes efforts to spread them to others. The persistence of
misinformation in the society is dangerous and require analysis for their prevention and
early detection [6,9].
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Misinformation during an event as it unfolds like casuality figures in a natural calamity,
are seldom accurate initially and the figures get updated or changed over a period of time.
Such spread of misinformation is often considered benign though media is considered
as one of the most important sources of misinformation. The other important sources of
misinformation are governments and politicians, vested interests and rumours and works
of fiction. Information asymmetry due to new media like social networks play a big role
in the spread of misinformation. Social networks spread information without traditional
filters like editing. The advent ofWeb 2.0 has resulted in greater citizen journalism result-
ing in increase in the speed of dissemination of information using multiple online social
media like social networks, blogs, emails, photo and video sharing platforms, bulletin
boards etc. The creation of cyber–ghettos has been discussed where the cyber space has
become echo chambers and blogs and other social media primarily link to like minded
sites propagating similar views than providing contrarian views. This leads to fractiona-
tion of the information landscape and consequent persistence of misinformation in large
sections of the society for a long period of time. This often result in people holding on
to their views on matters of pubic, political and even religious importance due to their
misinformed world views and ideology.
In [10], authors have enumerated a number of possible instances of misinformation
in the Internet. They include incomplete, out-of-date and biased information, pranks,
contradictions, improperly translated data, software incompatibilities, unauthorized revi-
sions, factual errors and scholarly misconduct. However, with the advent of Web 2.0 the
list has grown many times and social media is described as one of the biggest sources
of information including misinformation. Internet acts as a post modern Pandora’s box-
releasing many different arguments for information which are not easily dismissible [11].
Countering the spread of misinformation
Misinformation is easily another version of information. Countering spread of misinfor-
mation is not an easy task. The simple technique of labelling the other side as wrong is
ineffectual. Education of people against misinformation is necessary but not sufficient
for combating misinformation. An analysis of the counter measures proposed and mod-
eled in the literature against the spread of misinformation in OSNs are at times not in
consonance with the effectiveness of the measures as suggested in studies of cognitive
psychology. Theoretical framework for limiting the viral propagation of misinformation
has been proposed in [12,13]. The authors have proposed a model for identifying the
most influential nodes whose decontamination with good information would prevent the
spread of misinformation. The solution to the problem of limiting the spread of misin-
formation by starting a counter campaign using k influential nodes, called the eventual
influence limitation problem has been proposed in [14]. The influence limitation prob-
lem has also been studied in the presence of missing information. In both the papers,
the basic assumption is that when an infected node is presented with correct informa-
tion, it would become decontaminated. Studies in psychology have proved that removing
misinformation from infected persons is not easy [6]. The best solution to the spread of
misinformation is early detection of misinformation and launch of directed and effective
counter campaigns. In [15], the authors have proposed ranking based and optimization-
based algorithms for identifying the top k most suspected sources of misinformation in a
time bound manner.
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The strategies proposed in [6] for effective counter measures include:
• Providing credible alternative explanation to the misinformation.
• Repeated retractions to reduce the effect of misinformation without repeating the
misinformation.
• Explicit warnings before mentioning the misinformation so as to prevent the
misinformation from getting reinforced.
• Counter measures be suitably biased towards affirmation of the world view of the
receiver.
• Simple and brief retractions which are cognitively more attractive than the
corresponding misinformation.
Analysis of work done so far
We have analysed the cognitive process of adoption of information from studies in
psychology. The difficulties associated with distinguishing between misinformation, dis-
information and true information have been highlighted by most of them [2,3,6]. The
cognitive factors which decide the credibility of messages and their consequent accep-
tance by users can be effectively modulated in OSNs as seen during US elections [7,8]. The
inherent beliefs of a user play a very important part in accepting news items and fraction-
ation of cyber space is a consequence of this aspect of human mind. We explore different
factors contributing towards deciding the credibility of news items in the next section.
Misinformation has been widely accepted in the society, it becomes extremely diffi-
cult to remove. This has been suitably demonstrated during July 2012, when mass exodus
of thousands of people took place in India due to a sustained misinformation cam-
paign by vested interests using social media and other telecommunication networks [16].
Preventing the spread of misinformation is a more effective method of combating misin-
formation, than its subsequent retraction after it has affected the population. Significant
contributions towards successful debiasing of misinformation have been made in [6].
While studies in cognitive psychology are sufficient to understand the process of
adoption of information by users, we would like to explore the process of diffusion
of information. Process of diffusion is a group phenomenon, where we study the pro-
cess of adoption by different users over a period of time. Patterns arising out of diffusion
of information are better studied using algorithms from computer science. We study the
process in detail using ‘Twitter’ in Section “Credibility analysis of Twitter”.
A generic framework for detection of spread of misinformation
While formulating a generic framework for detecting spread of misinformation, it is
important to understand the cognitive decision making processes of individuals. A study
of individual decision making process from a cognitive psychology point of view followed
by a generic framework for detection of misinformation using the cues of deception is
given in the following subsections.
Identifying cues to deceptionusing cognitive psychology
The presence of misinformation in the society and real world social networks have been
studied from psychological point of view extensively. An excellent review of the mecha-
nisms by which misinformation is propagated and how effective corrective measures can
be implemented based on cognitive psychology can be found in [6]. As per the authors,
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the spread of misinformation is a result of a cognitive process by the receivers based on
their assessment of the truth value of information. Acceptance of information is more the
norm than otherwise for most of the people. When people evaluate the truth value of any
information they take into account four factors. The factors are characterised by asking
four relevant questions. These questions are given below and illustrated in Figure 1, where
we have summarised all relevant issues of misinformation.
1. Consistency of message. Is the information compatible and consistent with the
other things that you believe?
2. Coherency of message. Is the information internally coherent without
contradictions to form a plausible story?
3. Credibility of source. Is the information from a credible source?
4. General Acceptability. Do others believe this information?
Information is more likely to be accepted by people when it is consistent with other
things that they believe is true. If the logical compatibility of a news item has been
evaluated to be consistent with their inherent beliefs, the likelihood of acceptance of mis-
information by the receiver increases and the probability of correcting themisinformation
goes down. Preexisting beliefs play an important part in the acceptance of messages. Sto-
ries are easily accepted when the individual elements which make them up are coherent
and without internal contradictions. Such stories are easier to process and easily pro-
cessed stories are more readily believed. The familiarity with the sender of a message, and
the sender’s perceived credibility and expertise ensure greater acceptance of the mes-
sage. The acceptability of a news item increases if the persons are subjected to repeated
exposure of the same item. Information is readily believed to be true if there is a per-
ceived social consensus and hence general acceptability of the same. Corrections to the
misinformation need not work all the time once misinformation is accepted by a receiver.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section“Research design andmethodology”
we give our research design and methodology where we explain the generic framework
for the detection of misinformation in online social networks. As part of its implementa-
tion in ‘Twitter’, we carried out an analysis of the work done in estimating the credibility
Figure 1 Misinformation landscape. The figure summarises the different aspects of misinformation.
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of information propagation in ‘Twitter’. In Section “Methods” we explain our method-
ology and algorithm for speedy detection of spread of misinformation in Twitter to aid
a user to recognise misinformation and consequently prevent him from spreading it. In
Section “Results and discussion” we show the results obtained using two different Twitter
data sets. We outline our future work and conclude in Section “Conclusions”.
Research design andmethodology
Generic framework for detection of spread of misinformation
Based on the analysis of cognitive process, it becomes clear that the receiver obtains cues
of deception or misinformation from the online social network to decide on the accu-
racy of information. The same cues could be used by a social media monitoring system
to detect spread of misinformation, disinformation or propaganda. The proposed frame-
work for such a system is given in Figure 2. The evaluation process of truth value of
information begins with identification of suitable credibility metrics of the social network
being studied. The metrics would reflect the cues by which a user would have made his
decision of estimating the accuracy of information. The subsequent stages of evaluation
of truth value of information would involve using the identified metrics to establish the
credibility of the source and estimate the general acceptability of the message. A user
should be able to make informed decisions regarding the truthfulness of messages with
this help from the system and applying his own coherency and consistency values.
We have implemented the proposed framework for Twitter. The details of implemen-
tation is given in the subsequent sections. The first step involves the identification of
suitable metrics for evaluating the credibility of information propagated in Twitter. For
this, we have carried out a detailed analysis of the work done to study the credibility of
information propagated in Twitter with a view to identify the most appropriate parame-
ters which would enable detection of misinformation. We classified the parameters using
concepts of cognitive psychology and selected the most appropriate metrics.
Figure 2 A generic framework for evaluation of truth value of information for a user in an online
social network. The figure gives a broad framework for detecting misinformation using cues of deception to
help a user to make informed decisions.
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Credibility analysis of Twitter
An analysis of the literature to categorize tweets based on the four aspects of consistency
of message, coherency of message, credibility of source and general acceptability as given
in the previous section was done. A number of automated techniques using machine
learning algorithms have been proposed in the literature to classify tweets based on their
characteristic features.
Twitter as a social filter
The credibility of tweets propagated through Twitter has been analyzed in [17]. The
authors have used automated methods to assess the credibility of tweets related to trend-
ing topics. The features used by the authors include the re-tweeting behaviour, texts of the
posts and links to external sources. The authors used supervised learning techniques to
build a classifier to estimate the credibility of tweets. The types of features used to char-
acterize each tweet were of four types: message based features, user based features, topic
based features and propagation based features. Use of message features included length of
the message, positive or negative sentiments, presence of question marks or exclamation
marks, and also the use of hashtags and retweets. User based features included number
of followers and followees, number of past tweets etc. Topic based features were derived
from user based and message based features to include fraction of tweets that contained
hashtags, URLs and positive and negative sentiments. The propagation based features
included the depth of the retweet tree and number of initial tweets of a topic. Best results
of automatic classification of tweets were achieved using J48 learning algorithm. Senti-
ment features were found to be very relevant for predicting the credibility of tweets. The
fraction of tweets with negative tweets was found to be more credible as well as tweets
with greater number of retweets. The ability of the Twitter community to act as social fil-
ter of credible information has been clearly brought out in the paper. Credible users with
large number of followers and followees along with large tweet activity have better rep-
utation score and tend to propagate credible news. While validating the best features to
be used for automatic determination of credibility of tweets, the propagation based fea-
tures were ranked the best. The text and author based features alone are not sufficient to
determine the credibility of tweets. The credibility of tweets increases when propagated
through authors who have a higher reputation score, having written a large number of
tweets before, originate at a single or few users in the network and have many retweets.
Twitter during critical events
Reliability of Twitter under extreme circumstances was also investigated in [18]. The anal-
ysis of tweets related to earthquake in Chile in 2010 has revealed that the propagation of
rumours in Twitter is different from spread of credible news as rumours tend to be ques-
tionedmore. The authors selected confirmed news and rumours manually from the set of
tweets after the earthquake to analyse patterns of diffusion of information in the form of
re-tweets in the network. The use of Twitter as a collaborative-filter mechanism has been
proved with the help of this study. Further, the authors have verified the validity of the use
of aggregate analysis of tweets to detect rumours.
Credibility of tweets during high impact events was studied in [19]. The authors used
source based and content based features to indirectly measure the credibility of tweets
and their sources. Content based features in the tweets like number of words, special
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symbols, hashtags, pronouns, URLs and meta data like retweets were used. Source based
features like number of followers, number of followees, age etc were used to measure the
credibility of a user. The features were analysed for credibility using RankSVM and Rel-
evance feedback algorithms. The limitation of their work is the requirement to establish
ground truth using human annotation.
Spread of rumours and influence in Twitter
The spread of rumours in micro blogs was investigated in [20]. In particular, the authors
investigated the spread of rumours in Twitter to detect misinformation and disinfor-
mation in them. The authors have proposed a framework using statistical modeling to
identify tweets which are likely to be rumours from a given set of general tweets. They
used content based, network based and microblog-specific memes for correctly identify-
ing rumours. NLP techniques in sentiment analysis of the tweets was used for automatic
detection of rumours. Content based features like lexical patterns, part-of-speech pat-
terns, features corresponding to unigrams and digrams for each representation were used
for classification of tweets. The authors used these techniques for rumour retrieval i.e.,
identifying tweets spreading misinformation. The belief classification of users to identify
users who believe in the misinformation was done using the re-tweet network topology.
The importance of re-tweet network topology has been clearly brought out in the paper.
The authors have also used Twitter specific features like hashtags and URLs.
The measure of influence as given by the retweet mechanism offers an ideal mecha-
nism to study large scale information diffusion in Twitter [21]. The degree of influence of
nodes measured by calculating the number of followers and number of retweets showed
different results with little correlation between the two. The relationship between inde-
gree, retweets and mentions as measures of influence have been further analysed in [22].
The authors have supported the claim that the users having large number of followers are
not necessarily influential in terms of retweets and mentions. Influential users have sig-
nificant influence across a number of topics. Influence in terms of retweets is gained only
after concerted efforts. Surveys have also shown that the users are poor judge of truth-
fulness based on contents alone and are influenced by the user name, user image and
message topic when making credibility assessments [23].
Orchestrated semantic attacks in Twitter
Detection of suspicious memes in microblog platforms like Twitter using supervised
learning techniques has been done in [7,8]. The authors have used supervised learning
techniques based on the network topology, sentiment analysis and crowd-sourced anno-
tations. The authors have discussed the role of Twitter in political astroturf campaigns.
These are campaigns disguised as popular large scale grassroots behaviour, but actually
carried out by a single person or organization. As per the authors, orchestrating a dis-
tributed attack by spreading a particular meme to a large population beyond the social
network can be done by a motivated user. The paper discusses methods to automatically
identify and track such orchestrated and deceptive efforts in Twitter to mimic the organic
spread of information. The authors have describedTruthy, aWeb service to track political
memes in Twitter to detect astroturfing and othermisinformation campaigns. The impor-
tance of the use of retweets to study information diffusion in Twitter has been highlighted
by the authors. Network analysis of the diffusion of memes followed by sentiment analysis
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was used by the system to detect coordinated efforts to spread memes. The importance
of detection of the spread of memes at an early stage itself before they spread and become
indistinguishable from the real ones was also highlighted in the paper.
Being in the first page of the search results of any search engine is often regarded as an
indicator of popularity and reputation. Search engines have introduced real time search
results from social networking sites like Twitter, blogs and news web sites to appear in
their first pages. A concentrated effort to spread misinformation as in political astro-
turf campaigns could have far reaching consequences if such search results are displayed
prominently by search engines like Google. While studying the role of Twitter in spread of
misinformation in political campaigns, Mustafaraj et al. have concluded that one is likely
to retweet a message coming from an original sender with whom one agrees [24]. Simi-
larly repeating the same message multiple times indicates an effort to motivate others in
the community to accept the message. The authors described an attack named Twitter-
bomb where the attackers targeted users interested in a spam topic and send messages
to them, relying on them to spread the messages further. The authors have highlighted
the ability of automated scripts to exploit the open architecture of social networks such
as Twitter and reach a very wide audience. Measuring hourly rate of generation of tweets
seems to be a meaningful way of identifying the spam accounts.
Analysis ofmeasuring credibility of tweets
A summary of the analysis of the literature on measuring the credibility of information
propagation in Twitter along with the pointers towards detection of misinformation is
given in Table 1. The present efforts to detect the spread of misinformation in online
social networks can be broadly classified with relation to the questions of consistency of
message, coherency of message, credibility of source and general acceptability as given in
Section “A generic framework for detection of spread of misinformation”.
The analysis has brought out the following aspects:
• Automated means of detecting tweets are accurate, but computationally intensive
and manual inputs are required.
Table 1 Comparison of metrics for measuring credibility of tweets
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• Retweets form a unique mechanism available in Twitter for studying information
propagation and segregating misinformation.
• Analysing the information propagation using models in Computer Science and
concepts of Cognitive Psychology would provide efficient solutions for detecting and
countering the spread of misinformation.
Methods
We want to examine the information propagation pattern in Twitter to detect the spread
of misinformation. The cognitive psychology analysis revealed that source of information
is an important factor to be considered while evaluating the credibility. Moreover, the
difference between misinformation and disinformation is in the intention of the source
in spreading false information. The retweet feature of Twitter would enable us to under-
stand the information propagation and grouping tweets based on their sources would
reveal patterns which would enable us to estimate the credibility of the information being
propagated.
Out of the four parameters stated above, consistency of message and coherency of mes-
sage are internal to the user. These would be the first tools the user would employ to
confirm the authenticity of the received information. A user who is convinced of the
authenticity of the message or lack of it by these two parameters would not be both-
ered about using the other parameters to come to a decision. The external parameters of
credibility of source and general acceptability would be used when the user has greater
suspicion of the news item. We would assume that most of the news items spreading
misinformation would fall in this category and a user accepts and forward them after
evaluating the source of the message as well as the perceived general acceptance of the
message.
Data sets
We carried out experimental evaluation on data sets obtained from the online social
network ‘Twitter’. We collected data using Twitter API for two different topics. The
spreadsheet tool TAGS v5 used for collection of tweets using the Search API was pro-
vided byMartin Hawskey [25]. The topics enabled us to define the context for the study of
spread of information. We had carried out our studies on a number of data sets obtained
from Twitter using different keywords. Tweets were obtained for events like natural
calamities, acts of terrorism, political events etc. Here we describe two of those to bring
out our results. The keywords refer to different types of news items as explained below
and the statistical details are given at Table 2:
• Egypt. Heavy political unrest and massive protests spread in Egypt during the
months of Aug-Sep 2013. The news related to the these events were captured using
the keyword ‘egypt’ for the period from 13 Aug 2013 to 23 Sep 2013.
• Syria. The use of chemical weapons in Syria in the month of Aug 2013 attracted
worldwide criticism. The reflection in Twitter of the events was tracked using the
keyword ‘syria’ for the period from 25 Aug 2013 to 21 Sep 2013.
Table 2 Details of the data set
Data set #Tweets #Retweets #Senders #Re-tweeters Period
Egypt 141682 51723 10850 27532 13 Aug 2013 to 23 Sep 2013
Syria 104867 44708 11452 25415 25 Aug 2013 to 21 Sep 2013
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Methodology
We now describe the methodology we adopted to analyse the data sets to detect misin-
formation in them. We aim to detect non credible information which have the potential
to spread and possible collusion between users in spreading them. We outline the steps
and then give the complete algorithm in the form of a flow chart.
Step 1: Consider only the retweets
We use the Twitter user as the first stage of social filter by not considering any tweets
which are not retweets. The effectiveness of retweets to determine the credibility of infor-
mation in Twitter has been verified already by our review of work done in the field.
Retweets are the easiest means by which tweets are propagated and any person retweet-
ing a tweet personally has validated the information content in the tweet. Further, this
would also remove personal chats, opinions and initial misinformation not considered
credible. The fact that a tweet has not been retweeted also indicates that the probability
of it spreading to a sizeable proportion of the population is minimal.
Step 2: Evaluate the source of retweets
The credibility of the source is the next important factor to be considered. For this we
identified and segregated the retweets as per the source. This step would enable us to esti-
mate the unique tweets of the source which are being retweeted and the unique number
of users who are retweeting the same. The pattern of retweeting was analysed. Human
annotation was done to determine the credibility of the information. We found greater
unevenness amongst the users retweeting tweets of a source, when the credibility of the
source was poor. The sources spreading misinformation were being retweeted heavily by
a limited proportion of users who have at least retweeted the source once. This points
towards collusion between the users and deliberate attempts being made to spread mis-
information. Favouritism in the retweeting behaviour is most often due to questions of
credibility as has been validated in all the data sets studied.
The disparity in the retweeting behaviour was measured using Gini coefficient. Gini
coefficient is a measure of inequality of a distribution. The metric is more often used
to measure the disparity in income of a population. In the retweet graph, we wanted to
measure the pattern of distribution of retweets of the tweets of a particular source. A
value of Gini Coefficient nearer to zero would indicate a more even retweet behaviour
and a value above 0.5 and nearer 1 would indicate greater disparity in that a few users are
involved in retweeting a large number of tweets from the source and hence the possibility
of misinformation in the contents and reduced credibility of the source.
We calculate the Gini coefficient, G using the approximation of the Lorenz curve, where
it is approximated on each interval as a line between consecutive points. Let Xk be the
cumulative proportion of the ‘users’ variable, for k = 0, . . . n and X0 = 0 and Xn = 1
and let Yk be the cumulative proportion of the retweeets, for k = 0, ··, n and Y0 = 0 and
Yn = 1. If Xk and Yk are indexed such thatXk−1 < Xk and Yk−1 < Yk , the Gini coefficient,










The patterns of retweet behaviour of sample users from the two data sets are shown
in Figures 3 and 4. The graphs in Figures 3 and 4 depict the distribution of retweets
Kumar and Geethakumari Human-centric Computing and Information Sciences 2014, 4:14 Page 14 of 22
http://www.hcis-journal.com/content/4/1/14
Figure 3 Distribution of retweets from four sample sources not involved in the spread of
misinformation. The figure shows the retweeting pattern of tweets of non misinforming sources of
information. The Gini coefficient is nearer to zero for all such source nodes.
Figure 4 Distribution of retweets from four sample sources involved in the spread of misinformation.
The figure shows the retweeting pattern of tweets of misinforming sources of information. The Gini
coefficient is normally high and always above a minimum value of 0.4.
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amongst the users for four different sources. The differences in patterns of distribution
of retweets of the sources are quite obvious in the graphs. The graphs in Figure 3 are for
sources who are not spreading misinformation. The equitable distribution of retweets is
indicated by the low value of Gini coefficient G. A value of G equals zero would indicate
perfectly even distribution. A value of unity for G would indicate just the opposite with
one user completely taking all the share. The graphs in Figure 4 depict the distribution for
sources involved in the spread of misinformation. We measured a threshold of G as 0.5,
above which the sources were classified as spreading misinformation. The high values of
G and the consequent different shapes of the graph are easily identifiable. All the sources
involved in deliberate spread of misinformation had a high G value. But all the sources
having a high G value were not found to spread misinformation. We conclude that the
user would forward only tweets which he feels as possible misinformation and hence the
high G value would indicate sources of misinformation for all the messages which had to
be classified by automated techniques.
Step 3: Construct a retweet graph
We construct a retweet graph as in Figure 5. In the figure, the source ‘S’ has made three
tweets RT1, RT2 and RT3, which have been subsequently retweeted by user nodes U1, U2,
U3 and U4. Hence there are directed edges from the tweets to the source ‘S’ and from the
‘retweeters’ to the tweets. While U1, U3 and U4 have retweeted only one tweet of source
‘S’, U2 has retweeted all the three tweets.
Step 3: Evaluate the general acceptability of the tweet
We constructed a retweet graph similar to Figure 5 but involving all the sources and the
tweets which have been retweeted. The graph is a bipartite graphwith two types of nodes -
user nodes and retweet nodes. This graph would clearly depict who tweeted what and the
nodes responsible for their propagation in the network. The general acceptability of the
tweet was measured using PageRank algorithm in this retweet graph [26]. The PageRank
Figure 5 A retweet graph for a source ‘S’. A sample retweet graph to show the construction of the retweet
graph for a source ‘S’.
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of the source node is dependent on the PageRanks of its retweet nodes and then PageRank
of the retweet nodes are in turn dependent on the number and type of user nodes retweet-
ing them. A higher PageRank would indicate greater acceptability of the tweet - due to
more number of retweets and being retweeted by more credible user nodes. A tweet can
be considered generally acceptable if it has a higher PageRank. The threshold value is
taken as the value at which the tailed distribution begins. As seen in the data sets most of
the tweets have very low PageRank indicating that only a small proportion of the tweets
are getting retweeted more number of times. The PageRank of a node ni - retweet node
or a user node, PR(ni) was calculated based on the equation:











Here, n1, n2, ··, nN are the nodes in the retweet graph. S(ni) is the set of nodes that have a
link to node ni. L(nj) is the number of outgoing links from the node nj. N is the total num-
ber of nodes in the bipartite retweet graph. We used the standard value of damping factor
d as 0.85. Like all social computing strategies, PageRank is also susceptible to manipula-
tion. This would happen when there is collusion between the users where each of them
retweet the others’ tweets. Such collusion would invariably result in greater communica-
tion edges between the nodes involved. The resulting favoritism in retweet behavior can
be detected to a large extent using the Gini coefficient explained earlier.
Step 4: Content analysis of the finally filtered items
The output of the previous steps is given to the user. Based on his evaluation of the consis-
tency and coherency of themessage, and the additional quantified inputs of the credibility
of the source and the general acceptability of the tweet, the user would be able to make
an informed decision on the authenticity of the tweet. This would prevent more number
of people from retweeting misinformation. Preventive measures such as these are bound
to be more effective than any counter measures launched after the misinformation has
spread to a large section of the population.
Proposed framework for speedy detection of misinformation in Twitter
The proposed framework would evaluate the credibility of the source and the general
acceptability of the news items using collaborative filtering techniques to enable the user
to make informed decisions and thus possibly avoid spreading misinformation. We have
already outlined the steps for detection of sources involved in the spread of misinforma-
tion. The decision tree we constructed to implement the proposed sequence of actions is
given at Figure 6.
Summary of the steps involved
The algorithm would do the following:
• Identify the original source of information (tweets) in the network.
• Evolve a methodology to rate the credibility of the source based on the acceptance of
the tweets by the receivers.
• Construct a retweet graph to evaluate and measure the ‘misinformation content’ of a
tweet and determine its credibility by the level of its acceptance by all the affected
users using Gini coefficient.
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Figure 6 Algorithm for determination ofmisinformation in tweets. The flowchart giving the algorithm
to detect misinformation using a retweet graph to estimate the general acceptability of tweets and
credibility of sources.
• Segregate the possible sources of misinformation as non credible users and the
corresponding tweets.
• Evaluate the general acceptance of tweets from credible users using PageRank
algorithm in the retweet graph.
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• Present the credibility of the source and the general acceptance of the tweet to the
user to help him evaluate the information contents of the tweet.
Results and discussion
We evaluated the proposed algorithm in all the data sets. The retweet graphs of the data
sets were visualised using the softwareGephi [27]. In Figures 7 and 8 we show the retweets
graphs of the Egypt data set. While Figure 7 gives the broader view of the retweet graph,
an exploded view of a section of the retweet graph showing the internal details like name,
PageRank and modularity class of the nodes is shown in Figure 8. The nodes with names
starting with ‘RT’ are the retweets and the others are the user nodes in the bipartite graph.
Similar results were observed for the Syria data set also.
Measuring credibility of tweets
A plot of the Gini coefficients obtained for the Egypt and Syria data sets are given at
Figures 9 and 10 respectively. They show a heavy tailed distribution where the Gini coef-
ficients of most of the user nodes are 0. The figure corroborates the fact that most of the
communication are not misinformation. The user nodes with higher Gini coefficients are
fewer in number and hence they can be monitored effectively. A threshold value of 0.5 is
Figure 7 The Retweet graph of Egypt data set. Part of the retweet graph obtained from the Egypt data set
showing the retweet nodes and user nodes. The graph has been made using the software ‘Gephi’.
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Figure 8 Themagnified view of a section of the retweet graph of the Eqypt dataset. A section of the
retweet graph has been magnified to show the two types of nodes and the modularity number and
PageRank of the nodes.
meaningful to separate out the misinforming users, which has been validated by verifying
them. A plot of the PageRank scores obtained for the Egypt and Syria data sets are given
at Figures 9 and 10 respectively. As expected, they also show a heavy tailed distribution,
with few retweets and user nodes having higher PageRank values. This again supports the
fact that a few tweets would be retweeted more heavily than others.


































































Figure 9 Distribution of Gini coefficients in the Egypt data set. The figure shows the tailed distribution of
Gini coefficients of all the user nodes in the retweet graph in the Egypt data set. Majority of the user nodes
have Gini coefficients nearer to zero, indicating that spreading misinformation is limited to a very small set of
nodes.
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Figure 10 Distribution of Gini coeffcients in the Syria data set. The figure shows the tailed distribution of
Gini coefficients of all the user nodes in the retweet graph in the Syria data set. The results are similar to the
Egypt data set and majority of the user nodes have Gini coefficients nearer to zero, indicating that spreading
misinformation is limited to a very small set of nodes.
Analysis
Using Gini coefficient, the True positive rate to correctly identify all sources of misin-
formation was over 90%. The False positive rate, where users were wrongly identified
as sources of misinformation, was less than 10%. The False negative rate, where the
algorithm failed to identify sources of misinformation was less than 10%. The tailed distri-
bution of the spread of Gini coefficients in the data sets revealed that the sources involved
in the spread of deliberate misinformation were few as expected.
The Process of diffusion of information is more effectively understood using metrics
like Gini coefficient. If we consider retweets as a measure of adoption of information,
differences in adoption behaviour would indicate differences in perceived credibility of
information. Misinformation or disinformation are context specific and hence responses
of users assume great significance. If information from a certain source is accepted as
credible uniformly by a large number of users, quite possibly that source is credible. On
the other hand, if there are variations in the acceptance levels, the simple explanation is
apparent non credibility of messages of the source. Similarly if most of the users receiving
users do not repropagate information from a source also, his credibility is low. However,
gini coefficient value would be low as the the variations in acceptance are not pronounced.
This result is also acceptable, as we are unable to detect misinforming tweets which have
been decided by the collective intelligence of the network users to be non credible. Our
algorithm would segregate messages which are repropagated differently by a significant
section of users, which has the potential to create a certain perceived level of social con-
sensus. By deploying our proposed framework at the client end, we give better inputs
regarding social consensus and credibility of sources.
The PageRank algorithm could correctly identify the tweets whichwere being retweeted
in greater numbers. The threshold value would decide the level of classification of a news
item as generally acceptable or not. We had taken a threshold value of the PageRank score
before it starts to even out to near zero levels. In all cases, the acceptability of the tweets
were correctly evaluated.
The algorithm is proposed to be used by an user to detect the credibility of sources and
general acceptability of the tweets. It would also use the cognitive powers of the user to
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carry out the initial screening of messages. With that, the false positives of the algorithm
would be minimum and the algorithm would provide valid inputs to the user in an accu-
rate manner. The users who have a high degree of communication with the segregated
sources could also be now identified along with the tweets involved in the spread of false
information.
Conclusions
The paper has explored the application of principles of cognitive psychology in evaluating
the spread of misinformation in online social networks. We have proposed an effective
algorithm for speedy detection of spread of misinformation in online social networks tak-
ing Twitter as an example. Analysing the entire content of a social network using linguistic
techniques would be computationally expensive and time consuming. The aim was to
propose an algorithm which would use the social media as a filter to separate misinfor-
mation from accurate information.We were also interested only in misinformation which
were likely to spread to a large section of the social network. Analysing the problem from
a cognitive psychology point of view enabled us to understand the process by which a
human mind determines the credibility of information. The literature review of the work
done in detection of misinformation in Twitter brought out the critical features of Twitter
which would help us identify the cues to deception in tweets. Our proposed algorithm is
simple and effective in limiting the computation required to identify the users involved in
spread of misinformation and estimate the level of acceptance of the tweets.
Prevention is better than cure. The spread of misinformation can be prevented if users
are enabled to make correct decisions while retweeting the messages they receive. The
algorithmwould enable the user to make informed decisions while spreading information
in OSNs. The implementation of the algorithm at the client end can be done in the form
of a browser plug-in or a Twitter app. The proposed plug-in or the app would help the
user to make correct decisions while forwarding messages and thus prevent large scale
misinformation cascades. The important feature of the algorithm is that it does not make
use of any specific features of Twitter. The proposedmethodology would be applicable for
other online social networks also which support easy re-propagation like Facebook, with
its ‘share’ feature, Diggs with its ‘voting’ mechanism or even e-mail networks with their
‘forwarding’ features.
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